Acclaim Energy Well Blowout

Acclaim Energy Well Blowout – 2004

by Dr. Franklin Foster, 2006
[note: this article made possible by support and funding from the Petroleum Society of CIM, Lloydminster Section]
(photos courtesy of Canetic Resources Trust)

Around 8:00 on the morning of Sunday, December 12, 2004, as workover procedures resumed for the day on a well site just outside of Edmonton, a significant incident began. Later described as a gas well blowout and fire, the incident would attract national media attention (within 90 minutes), see the short-term evacuation of over 600 people, and cost over $45 million. However, it is arguable that overall the incident was a positive one. A great deal was learned about emergency response plans (ERP), and company and industry best practices ranging from technical issues through media relations and environmental compliance.

The well at 2-26-52-26W4 began as a producer of crude oil in 1962. Years later, Chevron converted the well to the production of natural gas. Acquired by Acclaim Energy Trust in August 2004, the well was undergoing routine servicing in December 2004. In the years of its life, however, the City of Edmonton had expanded to within approximately one kilometer of the once rural well. Additionally, nearby was the Stony Plain Indian Reserve, now referred to as the Enoch Cree First Nation.

The incident began upon the routine venting of the casing gas. A deep rumbling noise and shaking ground were congruent with an underground explosion. A mixture of gases, salt water, crude oil and particulant matter began flowing from the well. The first concern was for the safety of onsite personnel and the public. The work area was cleared, road barricades were erected, and staffed, to prevent access, and nearby residents were notified and evacuated to Edmonton hotels and motels where they were housed at Acclaim Ernergy’s expense.

Simultaneously, a Command Communications Centre was activated at the company’s head office in Calgary within two hours of the incident beginning. There was immediate contact with relevant governmental agencies such as the Energy and Utilities Board (EUB) and the Alberta Department of the Environment. Meanwhile, the media arrived at the site and Acclaim had to balance concern for their safety with their desire for access to “cover” the story. A media area was created at the site, outside the 250 meter danger area but close enough to allow photographs and video to be shot.

Overall, the incident revealed the greatest challenge but the most important processes had to do with communication. Local and national media attended. Aside from some early reporting which highlighted the sour gas angle of the story, media coverage on the whole was fair and balanced. This was probably due to the company’s commitment to open and transparent communication. A dedicated 800 telephone number was opened with information about the incident updated every two hours. As well, the company website opened a special section with detailed and continually updated information. This proved to be one of the most effective communication tools. During the course of the incident, 24 press releases were issued and at least 55 media interviews were provided. As well, 3,500 letters were sent to nearby residents informing them of the situation.

These numbers confirmed the need for trained, expert spokespersons who could deal effectively with the media’s requests. Acclaim hired outside experts in media relations but the cost of this route illustrated the need for trained and effective in-house personnel. The incident also underlined the need for clear understandings within the company of roles and responsibilities, lines of reporting, and authority and expertise to act as spokespeople. These internal lines of organization should be clear at all times, but any weaknesses and confusions are sure to be revealed during a critical incident.

Other critical lines of communication were with governmental agencies. In addition to the ones mentioned above, Acclaim had to deal with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the Federal Department of Fisheries (who arrived concerned about water contamination), and even the Federal Department of Mining. [During the cleanup phase, excavation depths exceed 35 feet from the surface, technically then becoming a mining operation.] In response to air quality concerns, three mobile air monitoring stations were on site. Ground water concerns were responded to by drilling three water wells to provide continual readings of water quality.

Another important area of communication was with the company’s insurers. Insurance adjusters were among the earliest on site. The insurance would eventually cover approximately two-thirds of the total cost. However, to facilitate this the company needed to have best practices in terms of office organization, accounting and so on. For example, ultimately more than 4,600 invoices were presented to the insurers to document expenses.

Relief wells

Meanwhile, the well blow out and fire were still continuing. The plan was to drill a relief well to intercept the well bore and plug off the flow to the problem well. Worker safety, wind direction, and technical issues regarding the use of magnetic surveys all made the drill difficult. Despite this, a second relief well was commenced, to save time in case the first one proved unsuccessful. The backup measure proved unnecessary as the first well was successfully completed and the blowout well blocked on January 11, 2005, one month after the initial incident.

Of course, the incident was still far from over. There needed to be work done to ascertain the cause of the blowout, to remove any potential of the well resuming releases, and ultimately to fully cleanup the site to today’s exacting environmental standards.

Earlier trenches had been dug to direct the flow of well discharge to holding ponds. Now all of this surface area that might be contaminated had to be removed and disposed of appropriately. A fleet of 154 vacuum trucks worked for weeks removing liquid and semi-liquid materials. [An estimated 10,000 barrels of salt water, for example, was removed. Ultimately, 6.6 acres of soil were also removed and replaced.] A fleet of machinery excavated the well site itself and eventually was able to extract the casing and identify the site of the explosion at 65 meters below the surface.

Follow-up committees of review agreed the initial explosion had resulted from a rare combination hydrogen, oxygen and other reservoir gases combined with a change in pressure. Certain technical procedures were adjusted to reduce even further the likelihood of this happening again. However, the main benefits stemming from the incident had to do with underlining the need to have in place company and industry best practices to respond effectively to critical incidents. As this episode showed, perhaps most important of all is the have clear, timely, transparent communication with all stakeholders. These communication lines, with governmental agencies, insurers, internal stakeholders, and even the public and the media, should be in place and be in use on an ongoing basis. Waiting to develop these communication lines until there is a critical incident, may lead a company to a truly devastating disaster.