Acclaim Energy Well Blowout – 2004
by Dr. Franklin Foster, 2006
[note: this article made possible by support and funding
from the Petroleum Society of CIM,
Lloydminster
Section]
(photos
courtesy of Canetic Resources Trust)
Around
8:00 on the morning of Sunday, December 12, 2004, as workover procedures
resumed for the day on a well site just outside of Edmonton, a significant
incident began. Later described as a gas well blowout and fire, the
incident would attract national media attention (within 90 minutes), see
the short-term evacuation of over 600 people, and cost over $45 million.
However, it is arguable that overall the incident was a positive one. A
great deal was learned about emergency response plans (ERP), and company
and industry best practices ranging from technical issues through media
relations and environmental compliance.
The well at 2-26-52-26W4
began as a producer of crude oil in 1962. Years later, Chevron converted
the well to the production of natural gas. Acquired by Acclaim Energy
Trust in August 2004, the well was undergoing routine servicing in
December 2004. In the years of its life, however, the City of Edmonton
had expanded to within approximately one kilometer of the once rural
well. Additionally, nearby was the Stony Plain Indian Reserve, now
referred to as the Enoch Cree First Nation.
The incident began upon the
routine venting of the casing gas. A deep rumbling noise and shaking
ground were congruent with an underground explosion. A mixture of gases,
salt water, crude oil and particulant matter began flowing from the well.
The first concern was for the safety of onsite personnel and the public.
The work area was cleared, road barricades were erected, and staffed, to
prevent access, and nearby residents were notified and evacuated to
Edmonton hotels and motels where they were housed at Acclaim Ernergy’s
expense.
Simultaneously, a Command Communications Centre was activated at the
company’s head office in Calgary within two hours of the incident
beginning. There was immediate contact with relevant governmental
agencies such as the Energy and Utilities Board (EUB) and the Alberta
Department of the Environment. Meanwhile, the media arrived at the site
and Acclaim had to balance concern for their safety with their desire for
access to “cover” the story. A media area was created at the site,
outside the 250 meter danger area but close enough to allow photographs
and video to be shot.
Overall, the incident
revealed the greatest challenge but the most important processes had to do
with communication. Local and national media attended. Aside from some
early reporting which highlighted the sour gas angle of the story, media
coverage on the whole was fair and balanced. This was probably due to the
company’s commitment to open and transparent communication. A dedicated
800 telephone number was opened with information about the incident
updated every two hours. As well, the company website opened a special
section with detailed and continually updated information. This proved to
be one of the most effective communication tools. During the course of
the incident, 24 press releases were issued and at least 55 media
interviews were provided. As well, 3,500 letters were sent to nearby
residents informing them of the situation.
These numbers confirmed the
need for trained, expert spokespersons who could deal effectively with the
media’s requests. Acclaim hired outside experts in media relations but
the cost of this route illustrated the need for trained and effective
in-house personnel. The incident also underlined the need for clear
understandings within the company of roles and responsibilities, lines of
reporting, and authority and expertise to act as spokespeople. These
internal lines of organization should be clear at all times, but any
weaknesses and confusions are sure to be revealed during a critical
incident.
Other critical lines of
communication were with governmental agencies. In addition to the ones
mentioned above, Acclaim had to deal with the Royal Canadian Mounted
Police (RCMP), the Federal Department of Fisheries (who arrived concerned
about water contamination), and even the Federal Department of Mining.
[During the cleanup phase, excavation depths exceed 35 feet from the
surface, technically then becoming a mining operation.] In response
to air quality concerns, three mobile air monitoring stations were on
site. Ground water concerns were responded to by drilling three water
wells to provide continual readings of water quality.
Another important area of
communication was with the company’s insurers. Insurance adjusters were
among the earliest on site. The insurance would eventually cover
approximately two-thirds of the total cost. However, to facilitate this
the company needed to have best practices in terms of office organization,
accounting and so on. For example, ultimately more than 4,600 invoices
were presented to the insurers to document expenses.
Meanwhile, the well blow out and fire were still continuing. The plan was
to drill a relief well to intercept the well bore and plug off the flow to
the problem well. Worker safety, wind direction, and technical issues
regarding the use of magnetic surveys all made the drill difficult.
Despite this, a second relief well was commenced, to save time in case the
first one proved unsuccessful. The backup measure proved unnecessary as
the first well was successfully completed and the blowout well blocked on
January 11, 2005, one month after the initial incident.
Of course, the incident
was still far from over. There needed to be work done to ascertain the
cause of the blowout, to remove any potential of the well resuming
releases, and ultimately to fully cleanup the site to today’s exacting
environmental standards.
Earlier trenches had been dug to direct the flow of well discharge to
holding ponds. Now all of this surface area that might be contaminated
had to be removed and disposed of appropriately. A fleet of 154 vacuum
trucks worked for weeks removing liquid and semi-liquid materials. [An
estimated 10,000 barrels of salt water, for example, was removed.
Ultimately, 6.6 acres of soil were also removed and replaced.] A fleet of
machinery excavated the well site itself and eventually was able to
extract the casing and identify the site of the explosion at 65 meters
below the surface.
Follow-up committees of
review agreed the initial explosion had resulted from a rare combination
hydrogen, oxygen and other reservoir gases combined with a change in
pressure. Certain technical procedures were adjusted to reduce even
further the likelihood of this happening again. However, the main
benefits stemming from the incident had to do with underlining the need to
have in place company and industry best practices to respond effectively
to critical incidents. As this episode showed, perhaps most important of
all is the have clear, timely, transparent communication with all
stakeholders. These communication lines, with governmental agencies,
insurers, internal stakeholders, and even the public and the media, should
be in place and be in use on an ongoing basis. Waiting to develop these
communication lines until there is a critical incident, may lead a company
to a truly devastating disaster.